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CHAPTER 2 
Conflict of Laws 
FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J. * 
§ 2.1. Tort Claims- Breach of Warranty- Emotional Distress and 
Wrongful Death. Until recently, Massachusetts followed the traditional 
lex loci delicti doctrine when addressing conflict-of-law questions in tort 
claims. 1 This "place of the wrong" rule states that the substantive law of 
the place where the act occurs determines whether there is a cause of 
action sounding in tort and governs all substantive questions relating to 
the existence of a tort claim. 2 In 1976, the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Pevoski v. Pevoski 3 definitively rejected the vested rights lex loci delicti 
rule, thereby repudiating the lex loci delicti doctrine that all issues in a tort 
case must be resolved by the law of the same jurisdiction. Instead, the 
Pevoski Court held that the disposition of a particular issue in a tort claim 
must depend on the law of the state which has the strongest interest in its 
resolution. 4 In so doing, the Supreme Judicial Court endorsed the con-
tacts choice-of-law analysis which a majority of states employ in the tort 
conflicts area. 5 
During the Survey year, in Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. ,6 the 
Supreme Judicial Court considered several questions involving breach of 
warranty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death; 
and held that Massachusetts law governed these issues under apposite 
choice-of-law rules. 7 The plaintiff's brother, a resident of Illinois, was 
killed in an airplane crash near Chicago during a flight from Chicago to 
Los Angeles.8 The airplane was manufactured by the McDonnell Douglas 
Corporation ("McDonnell Douglas"), a Maryland corporation which has 
its principal place of business in Missouri. The plane was operated by 
* FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J. is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§ 2.1. 1 See, e.g., Brogie v. Vogel, 348 Mass. 619,205 N.E.2d 234 (1965); Goodale v. 
Morrison, 343 Mass. 607, 180 N.E.2d 67 (1962). 
2 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-83 (1934). 
3 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976). See Nicholson, Conflict of Laws, 1982 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW § 7.4, at 262-65. 
4 371 Mass. at 359-61, 358 N.E.2d at 417-18. 
5 SeeR. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 6.16-6.19(2d ed. 1980). 
6 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d 581 (1983). 
7 /d. at 328, 450 N.E.2d at 582. 
8 /d. at 329, 450 N.E.2d at 583. 
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American Airlines Inc. ("American Airlines"), a Delaware corporation 
with a principal place of business in New York. 9 The plaintiff, Cohen, a 
resident of California, learned of the accident while listening to a radio 
broadcast in that state. 10 Some seven hours after the airplane crash, the 
plaintiff telephoned his mother at her home in Massachusetts to inform 
her of her son's death. 11 Shortly thereafter, the mother suffered a series of 
angina attacks, and two days later, she died of a heart attackY 
The plaintiff brought an action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts seeking compensatory and punitive dam-
ages (1) on behalf of his mother's estate for the conscious pain and 
suffering she experienced after learning of the death of her son in the 
airplane crash, and (2) on his own behalf for the wrongful death of his 
mother. 13 The plaintiff asserted these claims against both McDonnell 
Douglas and American Airlines on theories of negligence. 14 In addition, he 
brought claims against McDonnell Douglas on theories of strict liability 
and breach of warranty. 15 The defendants moved for summary judgment 
and dismissal of all claims on the grounds that Illinois law applied and that 
the relevant Illinois law did not permit recovery by the plaintiff. 16 
The United States District Court judge held that Massachusetts law 
applied to the plaintiff's negligence and strict liability claims. The judge 
further determined that Massachusetts law did not permit the plaintiff to 
recover on his strict liability claim against McDonnell Douglas. 17 The 
judge resolved no other issues but instead certified to the Supreme Judi-
cial Court the questions: (1) which state's law applied to the plaintiff's 
breach of warranty claim; (2) whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover 
damages if Massachusetts law applied to the breach of warranty claim; 
and (3) whether, under Massachusetts law, the plaintiff was entitled to 
recover damages for his negligence claims. 18 
The Supreme Judicial Court first addressed the question of what law 
should be applied to the plaintiff's claim against McDonnell Douglas for 
9 ld. at 330, 450 N.E.2d at 583. 
10 Id. at 329, 450 N.E.2d at 583. 
11 Id. at 329-30, 450 N.E.2d at 583. 
12 Id. at 330, 450 N.E.2d at 583. 
13 Id. at 328, 450 N.E.2d at 582. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 ld. 
17 Id. Massachusetts does not follow the strict liability tort doctrine. See Swartz v. 
General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 378 N.E.2d 61 (1978). 
18 389 Mass. at 328-29, 450 N.E.2d at 582. The United States District Court judge did not 
certify the question whether Massachusetts law applied to the plaintiff's negligence claims. 
The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the judge's conclusion that Massachusetts law 
controlled this issue. 389 Mass. at 339-40 n.ll, 450 N.E.2d at 588 n.ll. 
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breach of warranty. 19 The breach of warranty claim was based on section 
2-318 of the Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C. "). 20 
Section 1-105 of the U.C.C., the choice-of-law provision, states that in the 
absence of an agreement between the parties as to governing state law, 
the Massachusetts U .C.C. shall apply to "transactions bearing an appro-
priate relation to this state. " 21 In Cohen, the parties had not agreed that a 
particular state law should apply to a breach of warranty claim. There-
fore, according to the Court, resolution of the choice-of-law issue de-
pended on the interpretation of the words "appropriate relation. " 22 The 
Court, acknowledging that it had never previously attempted to define 
these words when considering whether a particular transaction bore an 
appropriate relation to Massachusetts, decided to apply established 
choice-of-law principles to the question of whether Massachusetts bore an 
"appropriate relation" to the plaintiff's breach of warranty claim. 23 Ac-
cording to the Court, the multi-state fact pattern of the case necessitated 
the examination of recognized conflicts rules in order to resolve the 
choice-of-law issue. 24 The Court, after finding that the breach of warranty 
of merchantability count was essentially a tort claim, applied choice of 
law principles relating to tort actions. 25 
As has already been noted, the Supreme Judicial Court endorsed the 
contacts approach in the Pevoski decision. The Supreme Judicial Court 
therefore turned to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 26 which 
has adopted the contacts approach in tort conflicts cases. The Court cited 
section 146 of the Restatement (Second) which calls for the application of 
the local law of the state in which injury occurred to determine the legal 
rights of the parties, "unless, with respect to the particular issue, some 
other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the 
parties. " 27 In particular, the Court referred to Comment e to section 146, 
which addresses situations in which tortious conduct occurs in one state 
19 The Erie doctrine required this conflicts inquiry. Under the Rules of Decision Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1652 (1970), a federal diversity court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply 
the substantive law of the state in which it sits. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
Substantive state law includes its conflict of laws rules. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. 
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed its 
Klaxon ruling in Day & Zimmerman v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975). 
20 G.L. c. 106, § 2-318. 
21 /d. at § 1-105(1). 
22 389 Mass. at 331, 450 N.E.2d at 583. 
23 /d. at 331, 450 N.E.2d at 583-84. See Nevins v. Tinker, 384 Mass. 702, 429 N.E.2d 332 
(1981). 
24 389 Mass. at 331-32, 450 N.E.2d at 584. 
25 /d. at 332-33, 450 N.E.2d at 584 (citing Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 386 Mass. 95, 99,434 
N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (1982)). 
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). 
27 /d. at § 146. 
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and the injury occurs in another. 28 According to Comment e, local state 
law where the personal injury occurred should be applied "when the 
injured person has a settled relationship to that state, either because he is 
domiciled or resides there or because he does business there." 29 The 
Supreme Judicial Court determined that under the Restatement (Second) 
approach, Massachusetts tort law applied in Cohen because Mrs. Cohen 
was injured and died in Massachusetts, the place of her residence. 30 The 
Court concluded its choice-of-law inquiry by stating: 
[N]o other State, including Illinois, appears to have a more significant 
interest in the plaintiff's claim than that of Massachusetts. Although the 
record reveals a variety of contacts with other States, none of these contacts 
is sufficient to outweigh the interest of Massachusetts in determining 
whether conduct which causes injury in this State to a resident of this State 
shall result in liability. 31 
The Supreme Judicial Court next considered the second question, 
whether the plaintiff Cohen was entitled to recover damages for his 
breach of warranty claim against McDonnell Douglas under Massachu-
setts law. It found that the plaintiff's breach of warranty claim was 
governed by chapter 106, section 2-318,32 which provides in relevant part 
that "lack of privity ... shall be no defense in any action brought against 
the manufacturer . . . to recover damages for breach of warranty, express 
or implied . . . if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer . . . 
must reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the 
goods." 33 The Court disagreed with the plaintiff's contention that his 
mother was " 'affected' " by McDonnell Douglas' aircraft in a way that 
allowed the imposition of liability under section 2-318. 34 The Court 
pointed out that the plaintiff's interpretation of the language of section 
2-318 would result in a greatly expanded liability for injury by emotional 
28 Id. at § 146, comment e. 
2o Id. 
30 389 Mass. at 336, 450 N.E.2d at 586. The Supreme Judicial Court assumed for purposes 
of the defendants' motions for summary judgment that Mrs. Cohen's angina attacks and 
subsequent death were the direct result of her emotional distress after hearing of the death of 
her son in the airplane crash. Id. at 330, 450 N.E.2d at 583. 
31 /d. at 336-37,450 N.E.2d at 586. The defendant McDonnell Douglas had argued that the 
place of injury in Cohen should be deemed to be Illinois where the airplane crash occurred. 
I d. at 334,450 N.E.2d at 585. McDonnell Douglas relied on cases involving claims for loss of 
consortium where some courts had applied the law of the place of the wrongful conduct 
rather than that of the marital domicile. /d. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAws§ 158 (1971). The Supreme Judicial Court correctly ruled that the loss of consortium 
cases were inapposite. 
32 389 Mass. at 337, 450 N.E.2d at 587. 
33 G.L. c. 106, § 2-318. The plaintiff's breach of warranty action on behalf of his mother's 
estate was an action for bodily injury to her in Massachusetts which resulted from learning of 
the death of her son in the airplane crash. 389 Mass. at 334-36, 450 N.E.2d at 585-86. 
34 389 Mass. at 337, 450 N.E.2d at 587. 
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distress. 35 The Legislature, the Court continued, did not intend that liabil-
ity under section 2-318 extend further than the scope of liability for 
emotional distress that was caused by negligence. 36 The Court concluded, 
therefore, that the plaintiff Cohen did not state a cause of action for 
breach of warranty against McDonnell Douglas. 37 
The Court in Cohen then addressed the third and final question of 
whether, under Massachusetts law, the plaintiff was entitled to recover 
damages for the conscious pain and suffering of his mother and for her 
wrongful death, allegedly caused by the negligence of McDonnell Douglas 
and American Airlines. The Court reviewed its decision in Dziokonski v. 
Babineau, 38 where it outlined the criteria for recovery in actions for 
negligently causing emotional distress under Massachusetts law. 39 In 
Dziokonski, the Court had held that a test of "reasonable foreseeability" 
should be applied in judging whether there is liability for a plaintiff's 
emotional distress caused by the defendant's negligence toward a third 
person. 40 The Dziokonski Court further determined that the imposition of 
liability depended upon other factors as well, "such as where, when, and 
how the injury for the third person entered into the consciousness of the 
claim~tnt, and what degree there was of familial or other relationship 
between the claimant and the third person .... " 41 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the 
Dziokonski principles required the imposition of liability for Mrs. Cohen's 
mental distress and resulting death. The Court pointed out that Mrs. 
Cohen did not learn of her son's death until seven hours after the airplane 
crash, did not see the accident or her son, and at all pertinent times, was 
at her home in Massachusetts, more than 1 ,000 miles from the scene of the 
crash. 42 The emotional distress which Mrs. Cohen suffered, the Court 
continued, was akin to the anguish any person feels after being told of the 
death of a loved one. Her anguish did not constitute compensable dis-
tress, which requires direct observation of a defendant's negligence or the 
consequences thereof. 43 Therefore, the Court concluded, the plaintiff was 
not entitled to recover damages upon his claims for his mother's con-
scious pain or suffering or for her wrongful death. 44 
35 /d. at 338, 450 N.E.2d at 587. 
36 /d. at 338-39, 450 N.E.2d at 587. 
37 Id. at 339, 450 N.E.2d at 588. 
38 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). 
39 389 Mass. at 339-41, 450 N.E.2d at 588-89. 
40 375 Mass. at 567, 380 N.E.2d at 301-02. 
41 Id. at 568, 380 N.E.2d at 1302. 
42 389 Mass. at 341, 450 N.E.2d at 589. 
43 /d. at 343, 450 N.E.2d at 590. 
44 /d. In its discussion of the reasons for denying liability, the court stressed the policy 
concern- the need to avoid an unreasonable expansion of liability in this kind of claim. /d. 
at 341-43, 450 N.E.2d at 589-90. 
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In summation, the Supreme Judicial Court, responding to the questions 
certified to it by the United States District Court, held that Massachusetts 
law applied to the plaintiff Cohen's breach of warranty and negligence 
claims and that, under the laws of Massachusetts, the plaintiff was not 
entitled to recover damages under either of these theories. 45 In Cohen, the 
Court reaffirmed the contacts choice-of-law approach which it had 
adopted for the first time in Pevoski, for use in torts conflict cases. 46 The 
Court's application of apposite sections of the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws47 indicates that the Court favors the Restatement (Sec-
ond) among the competing contacts analyses available in conflicts cases. 48 
The "most significant relationship" test of Restatement (Second) seems 
particularly appropriate as a means of identifying the relevant state law in 
a multi-state transaction. It is important to single out the different issues 
in a tortious action, and to apply to each issue the law of the jurisdiction 
which has the real concern with the occurrence and the parties in order to 
avoid oppressiveness to legitimate state interests. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in Cohen, has made an important inter-
pretative decision with respect to the meaning of the choice-of-law section 
1-105 of the U.C.C. 49 By juxtaposing the "appropriate relation" criterion 
of section 1-105(1) with the "most significant relationship" test of Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the Court seems to equate the 
two standards. This conjuncture of the two criteria gives welcome spec-
ificity to section 1-105(1) of the U.C.C., and further underscores the 
Court's predilection for the approach of the Restatement (Second) in 
conflicts analysis. 
§ 2.2. Assignment of Interest in Testamentary Trust by Beneficiary. 
During the Survey year, the Appeals Court in Boston Safe Deposit and 
Trust Co. v. Paris, 1 held that Massachusetts law governed a beneficiary's 
right to assign his interest in a testamentary trust because the Common-
wealth had the most significant relationship to the transaction. 2 In Paris, 
the will of Nellie Carter, a Massachusetts domiciliary, made Stella 
Cheremeteff the life beneficiary of a spendthrift trust with a testamentary 
45 Id. at 344, 450 N.E.2d at 590. 
46 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976). 
47 389 Mass. at 336, 450 N.E.2d at 586. 
48 The following theories have also been influential in promoting the contacts approach: 
(1) the late Professor Branerd Currie's "governmental interest" analysis, see B. CuRRIE, 
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); (2) Professor Robert Leftar's five 
"choice-influencing considerations" analysis, seeR. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CoNFLICTS LAw 
(3d ed. 1977). 
49 G.L. c. 106, § 1-105(1). 
§ 2.2. ' 15 Mass. App. Ct. 686, 447 N.E.2d 1268 (1983). 
2 Id. at 690, 447 N.E.2d at 1271. 
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power to appoint the corpus. 3 Cheremeteff, a domiciliary ofthe District of 
Columbia, died while residing in Italy, and, by her will, appointed in favor 
of Paris, an Italian citizen. 4 The Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company 
("Boston Safe"), a Massachusetts corporation, was the trustee under the 
will of Carter and executor of the will of Cheremeteff. 5 Relying on his 
expectations under Cheremeteff's will, Paris negotiated a series of loans 
from Union de Banques Suisses ("UBS"); a Swiss corporation. 6 
On April 7, 1972, Paris executed an assignment in English, which was 
delivered to both Boston Safe and UBS, acknowledging his indebtedness 
to UBS in the amount of $106,000, and instructing that securities regis-
tered in his name with Boston Safe be sent to UBS as security for the 
debt. 7 The assignment further stated that these instructions could not be 
amended or revoked without the consent of UBS. 8 Even though the 
document clearly indicated that Boston Safe was not free thereafter to 
make distributions to Paris without the consent of UBS, Boston Safe 
made three distributions to Paris after April 7, 1972, without permission. 9 
In Paris, the Appeals Court considered the relationship between these 
three distributions and Paris' assignment. 
Boston Safe, as trustee, brought suit in a Massachusetts probate court 
seeking instructions concerning the distribution of the balance of the 
trust. 10 The defendants Paris and UBS answered, each claiming this 
balance. In addition, UBS counter-claimed for damages against Boston 
Safe by reason of certain prior distributions made by Boston Safe to 
Paris .U The probate judge adopted the report of the master, to whom the 
principal action had been referred, and found that UBS was entitled to the 
balance of the trust and that UBS should recover from Boston Safe, on 
the counter-claim, the aggregate of the three post-April 7, 1972, distribu-
tions made to Paris. 12 
On appeal, the first choice-of-law question presented was whether 
Massachusetts or Swiss law governed Paris' right to assign or otherwise 
deal with his interest in the trust. 13 The Appeals Court held that the law of 
3 ld. at 687, 447 N.E.2d at 1269. 
4Jd. 
5 ld. at 686-87, 447 N .E.2d at 1269. 
• ld. at 687, 447 N.E.2d at 1269. 
7 Id. at 688, 447 N.E.2d at 1270. 
8 ld. 
9 ld. 
10 Id. at 687, 447 N.E.2d at 1269. 
11 ld. UBS, by cross-claim, sued Paris to recover upon the loans it had made to him.ld. 
UBS had a default judgment against Paris on the cross-claim. I d. 
12 ld. UBS's entitlement to the balance was not disputed by the parties in the appeal.ld. 
13 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 690, 447 N.E.2d at 1271. UBS appealed, seeking to enlarge its 
recovery. Id. at 687, 447 N.E.2d at 1269. 
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Massachusetts controlled Paris' right to assign his interest in the trust to 
UBS. 14 
The second conflicts question considered by the Appeals Court was 
which law determined the validity of Paris' assignment in favor of UBS. 15 
Boston Safe argued that Swiss law should be applied to judge the effec-
tiveness of the April 7, 1972, assignment as a means of accomplishing the 
secured transaction between Paris and UBS. 16 The court noted that the 
master had received evidence of the Swiss law on the effectiveness issue 
and had decided that Swiss law was immaterial. 17 The Appeals Court 
concurred with the master's conclusion that Massachusetts law gov-
erned. 18 The court cited section 209 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws as authority for the principle that the validity of an 
assignment is determined by the law of the state which has the most 
significant relationship to the parties and the assignment. 19 According to 
the court, while Switzerland could claim contacts as the domicile of the 
creditor, and as the likely place of the ultimate delivery of the trust assets, 
Massachusetts clearly had the more significant relationship. 20 The court 
noted that Massachusetts was the domicile of the trustee, Boston Safe, 
and of the original testatrix, Carter, and it was the place where the assets 
were held and administered as a trust. 21 The court therefore concluded 
that Massachusetts law had the stronger claim. 22 
On the issue of Paris' right to execute the assignment, the Appeals 
Court agreed with the master and the probate judge that, under Massa-
chusetts law, Paris' right to receive the trust principal was "vested" at the 
time of Cheremeteff's death by the terms of the Carter will, which called 
upon the trustee to pay over the fund to Cheremeteff's appointee upon 
her death. 23 According to the court, Paris had the right to assign his 
14 Id. at 690, 447 N.E.2d at 1271. 
15 ld. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 I d. The Appeals Court assumed, for the purpose of resolving the conflicts issue, that 
Swiss law would find the assignment of the securities was ineffective. The court observed, 
however, that it was not clear that the Swiss rule would extend to a transaction having 
significant contacts outside Switzerland, particularly when the effect would be to hurt a 
Swiss creditor. ld. at 691 n.5, 447 N.E.2d at 1271 n.5. 
19 Id. at 690, 447 N.E.2d at 1271. 
20 Id. 
21 ld. 
22 Id. at 690-91, 447 N.E.2d at 1271. 
23 I d. at 689, 447 N .E.2d at 1270. Boston Safe contended that Paris had no right to execute 
the assignment of April 7, 1972, in favor of UBS. I d. The beneficiary of a will, Boston Safe 
argued, could not assign trust assets before their actual distribution. Id. Boston Safe 
therefore contended it rightfully made payments to Paris from the trust corpus prior to its 
distribution even though the bank knew Paris had committed himself otherwise to UBS. I d. 
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interest before the actual distribution of the assets to him. 24 
The Appeals Court also referred to the law of validation. According to 
the court, "[i]f the issue were still thought to be doubtful, that law should 
surely be chosen which would carry out and validate the transaction in 
accordance with intention, in preference to a law that would tend to defeat 
it.'' 25 The Appeals Court held, therefore, that UBS was entitled to recover 
from Boston Safe the aggregate of the three post-April 7, 1972, distribu-
tions made to Paris, and affirmed the decree of the probate court. 26 
The court's decision on the choice-of-law issue was correct. The usual 
conflicts rule is that the validity of a testamentary trust of personal 
property is determined by the local law of the testator's domicile at death 
when the trust is to be administered in the domiciliary state, and absent a 
settlor's designation that the law of a particular state should control. 27 On 
the question whether the interest of a beneficiary can be assigned by him, 
the same principles apply. 28 In Paris, the settlor Carter had not designated 
which law should govern the trust. She died domiciled in Massachusetts 
and the trust was administered by Boston Safe in the Commonwealth. 29 It 
follows, therefore, that the law of Massachusetts governed the beneficiary 
Paris' right to assign his interest in the trust. 
The lex validitatis principle referred to by the Paris court is becoming 
an increasingly important policy consideration in conflicts law with re-
spect to consensual transactions between parties. The parties normally 
expect that their transactions are valid. Protection of the expectations of 
the parties by application of choice-of-law rules furthers the needs of the 
parties and gives importance to the values of certainty, predictability and 
uniformity of results. 30 Adherence to the law of validation is certainly a 
desirable development in Massachusetts conflicts law. 
§ 2.3. Workmen's Compensation - Tort Suit by Next of Kin Against 
Employer. During the Survey year, the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts, in King v. Williams Industries, Inc., 1 
24 ld. at 689, 447 N.E.2d at 1270. The beneficiary's right to assign his interest before 
distribution is the prevailing view. See 2 A. ScoTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS§ 153 (3d ed. 1967); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 153(2) (1957). 
25 Id. at 691, 447 N.E.2d at 1271. 
26 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 691, 447 N.E.2d at 1271. The Appeals Court also held, without 
further elaboration, that by the law of Massachusetts the assignment of April 7, 1972, was 
sufficient to effectuate the secured transaction between Paris and UBS. ld. at 690, 447 
N.E.2d at 1271. 
27 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 269 (1971). 
28 See id. at § 273, comment d. 
29 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 686-87, 447 N.E.2d at 1269. 
30 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 6(2), 244, comment C. 
§ 2.3. 1 565 F. Supp. 321 (D. Mass. 1983). 
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applied the conflict of laws rule of Massachusetts in a workmen's com-
pensation case. In King, the district court examined and adopted the 
approach taken by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 
Pevoski v. Pevoski 2 and in Saharceski v. Marcure, 3 and further clarified 
Massachusetts conflicts law. 
Jay King worked for Williams Industries, Inc. ("Williams Industries"), 
an Indiana corporation which engaged in plastic extrusion, from March of 
1977 through September, 1979. King was a resident of Indiana when he 
was hired by Williams Industries, which was insured under the Indiana 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 4 While working at Williams Industries, 
King was exposed to a carcinogenic chemical, polyvinyl chloride, which 
had been sold to the company by the Ethyl Corporation ("Ethyl"). He 
was diagnosed as having bile duct cancer, a terminal disease allegedly 
caused by his exposure to the toxic chemical while working and living in 
Indiana. In July, 1981, King and his family moved back to his family home 
in Massachusetts, where he died in February, 1982. 
Before his death, King, his wife, and his children, brought a diversity 
action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
against Williams Industries and Ethyl to recover damages for negligence 
and loss of consortium. 5 Williams Industries moved to dismiss the suit, 
contending that Massachusetts choice-of-law rules required that Indiana 
law govern the rights and liabilities of the parties in the case, and that 
Indiana law, properly applied, barred plaintiffs' claims. 6 The King family, 
in opposing Williams' motion, conceded that Indiana law would usually 
control under conflicts rules. They argued, however, that Massachusetts 
public policy, which is binding on a federal court in a diversity case, 
prohibited the application of Indiana law to the facts of this case. 7 The 
district court, applying Indiana law, granted summary judgment for the 
defendant. 8 
Jurisdiction in the King case was based upon diversity of citizenship. 
Consequently, the United States District Court was required to ascertain 
2 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976). See Nicholson, Conflict of Laws, 1982 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW § 7.4 at 262-65. 
3 373 Mass. 304, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (1977). See Nicholson, Conflict of Laws, 1982 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW § 7.5 at 265-68. 
4 565 F.Supp. at 323. The district court did not discuss the domicile-residence problem in 
its opinion. It would seem that Indiana was King's domicile during the 1977-79 period. 
5 I d. at 322. After King's death, his estate was substituted as the party plaintiff and leave 
was granted to amend the complaint and add a claim for wrongful death. ld. 
6 I d. The district court treated the defendant's motion as one for summary judgment since 
it found there was no material issue of fact in dispute. /d. at 322-23. 
7 ld. at 322. 
8 ld. at 327. 
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and follow the substantive law of Massachusetts, 9 including its conflict of 
laws rules. 10 The court, addressing first the issue of tort liability, 11 turned 
to the case ofPevoski v:Pevoski, 12 in which the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts had abandoned the vested rights lex loci delicti rule in tort 
conflicts cases. In Pevoski, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that the 
disposition of issues ''must tum ... on the law of the jurisdiction which 
has the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue pre-
sented.'' 13 The King court noted that the significant contacts approach in 
Pevoski was tantamount to the adoption of the "most significant relation-
ship" criterion of Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws by the Su-
preme Judicial CourtY 
In addition to Pevoski, the district court also discussed the decision in 
Saharceski v. Marcure ,15 In Saharceski, the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court resolved a choice-of-law problem in a workmen's compensa-
tion case in which employees, residents of Massachusetts who were hired 
in Massachusetts by a Massachusetts corporation, were involved in an 
automobile accident while driving through Connecticut in the course of 
their employment. 16 In finding that Massachusetts law governed, the 
Supreme Judicial Court stated that the application of the law of the state 
of common employment provided both a certain basis for the resolution of 
the issue and knowledge that the maintenance of a tort suit would not 
depend solely on the fortuitous place of the accident. 17 The Saharceski 
Court concluded its consideration of the conflicts problem as follows: 
"The elimination of happenstance, a sort of unknowing geographical 
Russian roulette, as the controlling factor is particularly significant in a 
case where no business was to be transacted in the jurisdiction where the 
injury took place." 18 
In King, the United States District Court applied the principles estab-
9 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
10 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
11 565 F. Supp. at 324. 
12 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976). In Pevoski, the Court held that Massachusetts 
law governed the issue of interspousal immunity between spouses domiciled in Massachu-
setts, even though the suit for damages arose from an automobile accident in New York. /d. 
at 358, 361, 358 N.E.2d at 417-18. 
13 371 Mass. at 360, 358 N.E.2d at 417. 
14 565 F. Supp. at 324. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145-46 
(1971). 
15 373 Mass. 304, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (1977). 
16 /d. at 305, 366 N.E.2d at 1246. The employee-passenger brought suit in Massachusetts 
against the employee-operator of the vehicle, seeking to recover damages for alleged 
negligence. /d. Connecticut law permitted recovery in these circumstances. /d. The law of 
Massachusetts precluded such recovery. Id. 
17 /d. at310-12, 366 N.E.2d at 1249. 
18 /d. at 311-12, 366 N.E.2d at 1249. 
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lished in Pevoski and Saharceski, and held that Indiana law governed the 
rights and liabilities of the parties. 19 The court reasoned that all the 
significant events involved in the suit between the King family and Wil-
liams Industries occurred in Indiana - the contract of hire, the alleged 
negligence, the injury to King, and the diagnosis of his terminal cancer. 
According to the court, Massachusetts was merely a past residence of 
King and the residence of the plaintiffs at the time of King's death. 20 The 
court noted that the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act excluded 
actions by employees against employers for negligence and suits by the 
spouses and next of kin of employees against employers for loss of 
consortium or wrongful death. 21 
Before reaching a definitive choice-of-law conclusion, the district court 
addressed the public policy argument raised by the King family. 22 In 
conflicts cases, a forum state need not apply foreign law, otherwise 
applicable, which is repugnant to the forum state's public policy. 23 A 
forum state's public policy is binding on federal courts in diversity 
cases. 24 The plaintiffs relied upon the decision of the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc. ,25 as evidence that 
Massachusetts would consider it extremely important to permit Massa-
chusetts dependents of an injured employee to recover for their own 
injuries. 26 According to the plaintiffs, Ferriter enunciated a strong policy 
that Massachusetts would no longer allow a negligent employer to hide 
beneath the cloak of the exclusivity clause of a workmen's compensation 
statute. 27 
The United States District Court, however, agreed with the defendant 
that the Massachusetts workmen's compensation statute28 also barred the 
plaintiffs' claims. 29 The court noted that the Ferriter decision made it clear 
that an employee's negligence claims, as well as claims for wrongful death 
against an employer covered by chapter 152 of the General Laws, were 
19 565 F. Supp. at 324. 
20 ld. 
21 See IND. CoDE § 22-3-7-6 (1976). The Indiana act is a typical compulsory workmen's 
compensation statute which guarantees compensation to an injured employee under princi-
ples of strict liability in exchange for immunity from tort liability for the employer. See R. 
LEFLAR, AMERiCAN CoNFLICTS LAw§ 158 (3d ed. 1977); E. ScoLES & P. HAY, CoNFLICT oF 
LAWS§ 17.45 (1982). 
22 565 F. Supp. at 326-27. 
23 See W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 329-34, 384-99, 464-66 (8th ed. 
1984). 
24 Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). 
25 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980). 
26 565 F. Supp. at 326. 
27 Id. 
28 G.L. c. 152. 
29 565 F. Supp. at 326. 
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barred by Massachusetts law. 3° Consequently, the court found that Mas-
sachusetts public policy did not conflict with the bar contained in the 
Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act. 31 Furthermore, according to the 
court, Ferriter did not recognize an action for loss of consortium by family 
members where the employee was hired and injured outside of Massachu-
setts, and died as a result of the injury. 32 Finally, the court determined 
that Massachusetts had no significant interest in the rights of Indiana 
employees, their spouses and their next of kin in relation to Indiana 
employers. 33 In view of the Saharceski decision and the "most significant 
relationship" approach offered by the Restatement (Second), 34 the court 
found no Massachusetts public policy against application of Indiana law 
to the claims of King's wife and children. 35 Having thereby resolved the 
choice-of-law and public policy issues, the district court held that the 
defendant Williams Industries was entitled to summary judgment on all of 
the plaintiffs' claims against it. The court found that Massachusetts state 
courts would apply Indiana law to the facts of the case and that Indiana 
law clearly barred the plaintiffs' claims. 36 
The resolution of the choice-of-law question in King follows the ap-
proach taken in recent workmen's compensation cases. 37 Workmen's 
compensation statutes were designed to provide a quick and certain 
remedy for employees who sustain work injuries by statutorily imposing 
absolute but limited and determinate liability upon the employer. These 
laws represent a compromise that inures to the benefit of both employer 
and employee. Social justice necessitates such a quid pro quo arrange-
ment in our industrial world. It is logical, therefore, to choose the com-
pensation law of the state with the substantial connection to the employ-
ment relationship. As the United States District Court's analysis clearly 
indicates, only Indiana had a significant interest in the rights of the parties 
in this case. 
Although the decision of the district court inKing is not as authoritative 
as an opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the King 
court was acting as a surrogate for the Supreme Judicial Court in a 
diversity case. The district court analyzed and applied the relevant deci-
sions of the Supreme Judicial Court to the choice-of-law issues before it. 
30 Id. 
31 /d. at 327. 
32 Id. at 326-27. The Ferriter case was concerned only with a Massachusetts injury and 
Massachusetts parties. There was no conflict of laws problem in the case. 
33 I d. at 327. 
34 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS at §§ 145-46, 184. 
35 565 F. Supp. at 327. 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958); LEFLAR, supra note 21, at 
§ 160. 
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Thus, the King opinion is important evidence of the conflicts law of 
Massachusetts. Clearly, Massachusetts courts are committed to a con-
tacts approach to conflicts problems, more specifically, to the "most 
significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws. 38 • 
§ 2.4. Choice-of-Forum Contract Provisions- Enforcement of Provision 
under Federal Law in Federal Courts. It has become increasingly common 
for parties to a commercial contract to select the forum in which they will 
bring disputes arising under their agreement. 1 Historically, forum selec-
tion clauses were not favored by American courts. Many federal and state 
courts declined to enforce such clauses on the grounds that the clauses 
were contrary to public policy, or that their effect was to deprive the court 
of its jurisdiction. 2 This anachronistic view is being abandoned by many 
courts in favor of enforcement of such clauses when enforcement is 
reasonable under the circumstances. 3 The decision by the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts in C. Pappas Co., Inc. v. 
E. & .T. Gallo Winery 4 illustrates this trend toward enforcement of forum 
selection provisions in contracts .. 
The plaintiff, C. Pappas Company, Inc. ("Pappas"), was a Massachu-
setts corporation with its principal place of business in Boston. 5 Pappas, a 
wholesaler licensed under Massachusetts law to distribute alcoholic be-
verages, entered into an agreement with the defendant, the E. & J. Gallo 
Winery of Modesto, California ("Gallo"), whereby Pappas was desig-
nated a wholesale distributor of Gallo products in Massachusetts. 6 The 
eighth term of the agreement provided that the law of California would 
govern construction of the terms of the contract, and that any cause of 
action arising between the parties under the agreement should be brought 
only in a court having jurisdiction in California. 7 
Pappas brought suit in the United States District Court in Massachu-
setts against Gallo alleging, inter alia, violations of the federal antitrust 
laws and state law claims for breach of contract. 8 The gravamen of 
Pappas' complaint was that Gallo had breached its contract with Pappas 
38 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the 
United States District Court. King v. Williams Industries, Inc., 724 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1984). 
§ 2.4. 1 SeeR. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW§ 52 (3d ed. 1977); W. REESE & M. 
RO!;lENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-88 (8th ed. 1984). 
2 ld. 
3 ld. 
4 565 F. Supp. 1015 (D. Mass. 1983). 
5 Id. at 1016. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
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and had entered into a conflicting contract with and conspired with an-
other company in restraint of trade. 9 Pappas sought damages and injunc-
tive relief. 
In response, the defendant Gallo filed a motion to dismiss or, in the 
alternative, to transfer the suit in compliance with the terms of the parties' 
agreement of distributorship. 10 Citing apposite federal procedural rules, 
Gallo requested that the district court either dismiss the action for impro-
per venue or transfer the suit to the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California. 11 The court refused to dismiss the suit but 
transferred it to the Eastern District of California. 12 
The first question addressed by the court in Pappas was whether the 
issue of enforcement of the forum selection clause in the distributorship 
contract should be decided by federal or state law. 13 The court held that 
the enforcement issue was a federal law matter. The Pappas court thus 
agreed with a recent case in which the district court in Massachusetts had 
decided that "in the federal courts the question of enforcement of forum 
selection clauses is to be decided under federal law." 14 
The Pappas court then examined federal cases which have focused on 
forum selection clauses. The court cited the leading case of The Bremen v. 
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 15 in which the United States Supreme Court held 
that forum selection clauses are "prima facie valid and should be enforced 
unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' 
under the circumstances." 16 The district court in Pappas characterized 
the position of the United States Supreme Court as "the modem view." 17 
The court next set forth the standard in the First Circuit for establishing 
that a forum selection clause is unreasonable: the objecting party ''must 
present evidence of fraud, undue influence, overweening bargaining 
power or such serious inconvenience in litigating in the selected forum 
that it is effectively deprived of its day in court.'' 18 
The court noted that Pappas' principal argument was that the forum 
selection provision in the distributorship contract should not be enforced 
because it did not result from equal bargaining positions. Pappas por-
9 Id. at 1017. 
10 /d. 
11 /d. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (1970). 
12 565 F. Supp. at 1018-19. 
13 /d. at 1017. 
14 Id. (citing Northeast Theatre Corp. v. Edie and Ely Landau, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 833 (D. 
Mass. 1983)). 
15 407 u.s. 1 (1972). 
16 /d. at 10. 
17 565 F. Supp. at 1017. 
18 /d. See Fireman's Fund Amer. Ins. Cos. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co., Inc., 492 
F.2d 1294, 1297 (1st Cir. 1974). 
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trayed itself as a small wholesaler coerced into signing the contract by 
Gallo, an industry giant. 19 The district court rejected Pappas' adhesion 
contract argument. The court observed that Pappas was a major corpora-
tion which did a large volume of business throughout Massachusetts, and 
that both Pappas and Gallo were sophisticated companies accustomed to 
entering into business contracts involving large sums of money. 20 More-
over, the court concluded, the defendant Gallo's insistence on the forum 
selection clause was for a reasonable purpose: to avoid the possibility of 
defending multiple lawsuits brought by its many distributors throughout 
the United States, and to give certainty and uniformity to the defendant's 
business operations by providing that all disputes would be judged in 
California courts under California law. 21 
The plaintiff Pappas also contended that it would suffer substantial 
hardship if required to litigate the case in California. 22 The district court, 
however, saw no evidence that the inconvenience of litigating in Califor-
nia would deprive Pappas of its day in court. 23 Moreover, the court noted, 
because Pappas' complaint alleged a conspiracy in restraint of trade, the 
testimony of Gallo's management personnel in California would be impor-
tant to the defendant. 24 The court found that Pappas could not establish 
that so many more witnesses resided in Massachusetts than in California 
that a transfer would not be in the interests of justice. 25 
The final question before the court was whether the case should be 
dismissed or transferred. 26 The district court, stating that the United 
States Supreme Court in The Bremen case had emphasized that the effect 
of a forum selection clause was not to '"oust' a court of jurisdiction," 27 
refused to dismiss the action. 28 Because Pappas had consented to biing its 
actions against Gallo in California under the terms of the distributorship 
contract, and because California was both the residence of the defendant 
Gallo and the place where the cause of action arose, the court ordered the 
case transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of California. 29 
The decision in Pappas that the question of enforcement of forum 
selection clauses should be decided under federal law is clearly correct. 
19 565 F. Supp. at 1017-18. 
20 /d. 
21 Id. at 1018. 
22 /d. 
23 /d. 
24 ld. 
25 /d. 
26 /d. 
27 407 U.S. at 12. 
28 565 F. Supp. at 1018. 
29 /d. at 1018-19. 
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Congress may provide for the location of trials in the federal courts. Th~ 
question of proper venue in a particular federal court is essentially a 
matter of procedure peculiarly within the province of the federal courts. 
Federal venue questions do not raise substantive state issues. Neither the 
Rules of Decision Act30 nor the decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins 31 applies. 
In addition, the enforcement of the forum selection clause in Pappas is 
representative of the trend in American courts today. 32 Section 80 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws supports enforcement of these 
clauses, stating that "[t]he parties' agreement as to the place of the action 
cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be 
given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable. " 33 Parties to a contract 
may not deprive any court of the jurisdiction which it would otherwise 
possess. A court withjurisdiction, however, has the discretion to effectu-
ate a forum selection provision which is fair and reasonable and which 
serves the convenience of the parties. Such clauses are compatible with 
today's business practices. As the United States Supreme Court noted in 
The Bremen case: "[T]he expansion of American business and industry 
will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist 
on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws 
and in our courts .... We cannot have trade and commerce ... exclu-
sively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts. " 34 
The modem trend favoring the enforcement of forum selection clauses 
seems well established in the federal courts, and state courts are begin-
ning to move in the direction of enforcement. 35 Several older decisions of 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts enunciated the principle 
that forum selection clauses are unenforceable because they violate the 
public policy which entrusts matters of jurisdiction and venue to the 
courts. 36 It seems doubtful that these cases would be followed in Massa-
chusetts today. Given the pre-eminence of the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws in its conflicts decisions in recent years, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court would undoubtedly honor the parties' choice 
of forum if the provision were fair and reasonable. 
§ 2.5. Contract Choice-of-Law Rule- Law of Jurisdiction with Greater 
Governmental Interest Controls. Conflicts law pertaining to the validity of 
30 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1970). 
31 304 u.s. 64 (1938). 
32 See E. ScoLEs & P. HAY, CoNFLICT oF LAws§§ 11.2-11.8 (1982). 
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971). 
34 407 U.S. at 9. 
35 See ScoLES & HAY, supra note 32, at§§ 11.5-11.6. 
36 See, e.g., Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, 111 N.E. 
678 (1916). 
17
Nicholson: Chapter 2: Conflict of Laws
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1983
32 1983 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 2.5 
contracts has been characterized by confusion. Until recently, American 
courts have applied any one of three different conflicts rules to determine 
the validity of contracts in a multistate setting, without acknowledging 
that the rules in question are often inconsistent. These theories are: (1) the 
law of the place of the making of the contract; (2) the law of the place of 
the performance of the contract; and, (3) the law intended by the parties to 
control the contract. 1 The original Restatement of Conflict of Laws 
adopted the place-of-making rule, lex loci contractus. 2 Automatic applica-
tion of the lex loci contractus rule was generally rejected by the American 
courts, however, because the doctrine did not identify the state with the 
greatest interest in a disputed contract in a large number of cases. The 
indiscriminate use of the three traditional rules has continued, although to 
a lessening degree, in recent years. 3 
An approach to the validity-of-contract problem which is receiving 
increasing approbation by the courts and publicists is the ''grouping of 
contacts'' theory. This new rule emphasizes that the law of the place 
which has significant contacts with the parties and with the transaction 
should govern the validity of the contract. Obviously, the ''grouping of 
contacts" theory gives less certainty and predictability than the first 
Restatement's rigid place-of-making rule. Nevertheless, the rule permits a 
court to focus upon the law of the jurisdiction which has the paramount 
interest in the multistate transaction. The Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws has aligned itself with the "contacts" standard. In 
rejecting the dogma of the lex loci contractus, the Restatement (Second) 
states that the validity of a contract is governed by the law of the state 
with which the transaction has "its most significant relationship. " 4 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently indicated its will-
ingness to abandon the traditional place-of-making rule in favor of "a 
more functional approach" when determining what law to apply in con-
tract cases. 5 During the Survey year, the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts, in Bushkin Associates, Inc. v. Raytheon 
Co. ,6 considered the conflict oflaws rule in a diversity contract case. The 
district court in Bushkin, noting the new approach taken by the Supreme 
Judicial Court, predicted that the Massachusetts court, when squarely 
confronted with the question, would abandon the place-of-making rule in 
§ 2.5. 1 See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CoNFLICTS LAw§§ 144-47 (3d ed. 1977); E. ScoLEs 
& P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 18.13-18.15 (1982). 
2 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934). 
3 See LEFLAR, supra note 1, at§ 145; ScoLES & HAY, supra note 1, at§ 18.14. 
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). 
5 Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc., 378 Mass. 535, 541, 392 N.E.2d 1045, 
1048-49 (1979). See Nicholson, Conflict of Laws, 1982 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw§ 7.6 at 
269-71. 
6 570 F. Supp. 5% (D. Mass. 1983). 
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favor of interest analysis. 7 Consequently, the district court's opinion in 
Bushkin strengthens the anticipation that the Supreme Judicial Court will 
shortly discard the lex loci contractus rule in contract conflicts cases. 
The plaintiffs, Bushkin Associates and Merle Bushkin ("Bushkin"), 
brought suit to recover on an oral fee agreement allegedly made between 
Bushkin and the defendant, Raytheon Company ("Raytheon"), for ser-
vices in connection with Raytheon's acquisition of Beech Aircraft Corpo-
ration(" Beech").8 Bushkin also sought payment for the reasonable value 
of any information Bushkin gave Raytheon, and alleged that Raytheon 
had engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices.9 Raytheon moved 
for summary judgment, contending that the New York statute of frauds 
should apply to the case and that, under New York law, the oral agree-
ment would be unenforceable. 10 Bushkin answered that the Massachu-
setts statute of frauds, which would not invalidate the oral agreement, 
should control. 11 The district court ordered summary judgment for Ray-
theon, holding that the New York statute of frauds governed the action 
and that, under New York law, the oral agreement was invalidY 
The factual background inBushkin identified New York and Massachu-
setts as the states connected with the transaction. 13 Bushkin was a New 
York resident specializing in mergers and acquisitions. He was the presi-
dent of Bushkin Associates, a corporation organized and based in New 
York. 14 Raytheon was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business in Massachusetts. 15 Bushkin's dealings with Raytheon concern-
ing the acquisition of Beech began in 1971. 16 Negotiations were carried on 
via telephone conversations between Bushkin in New York, and Ray-
theon in Massachusetts.17 Bushkin alleged that the oral fee agreement was 
made in a telephone call which occurred in January, 1975. During this 
conversation, Raytheon's representative acknowledged that Raytheon 
was interested in acquiring Beech, and that Raytheon would pay a fee of 
one percent of the value of the transaction to Bushkin if the acquisition of 
Beech took place. 18 Raytheon's representative later told Bushkin that 
7 /d. at 599. 
8 Id. at 5%. 
9 /d. See G.L. c. 93A. 
10 570 F. Supp. at 596. 
11 /d. 
12 /d. at 603. 
13 570 F. Supp. at 597-98. The district court adopted Bushkin's version of the facts for the 
purpose of ruling on Raytheon's motion for summary judgment. See 570 F. Supp. at 597 n.l. 
14 /d. at 597. 
15 /d. 
16 /d. 
17 /d. 
18 /d. 
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Raytheon had decided that it was no longer interested in Beech. 19 Subse-
quently, Raytheon contracted in writing with another company for con-
sulting services concerning mergers and acquisitions, and, in February 
1980, Raytheon acquired Beech with the help of its new consulting com-
pany, paying the latter $1,100,000 for its services. 20 
The United States District Court in Bushkin addressed the crucial 
question of whether New York or Massachusetts law governed the par-
ties' oral agreement. 21 The New York statute offrauds invalidated an oral 
agreement to pay compensation for services rendered in connection with 
the sale of a business, while the Massachusetts statute of frauds did not 
void such contracts. 22 The court, in compliance with the Erie-Klaxon 
doctrine applicable in cases involving diversity jurisdiction, followed the 
conflicts law of Massachusetts. 23 
Bushkin argued that, in contract cases, the Massachusetts conflicts rule 
is that the law of the place where the contract was made governs. 24 
According to Bushkin, since the oral agreement in question was made in 
Massachusetts, Massachusetts law applied and the oral fee contract was 
valid. 25 Raytheon responded that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court had indicated that it was ready to abandon its place-of-making 
doctrine in favor of a more functional conflicts rule in deciding what law to 
apply in contract cases. 26 Because the Supreme Judicial Court had sig-
naled this new development in conflicts analysis in its opinion in Choate, 
Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc. ,27 the district court used the Choate, 
Hall decision as a starting point for considering ~he conflicts problem in 
Bushkin. 28 
The United States District Court predicted that the Supreme Judicial 
Court would discard the place-of-making rule when next faced with the 
question of defining conflicts law in contract cases for Massachusetts. 29 
Therefore, according to the court, it was not crucial to decide where the 
contract between Bushkin and Raytheon was made. 30 The court did find it 
19 /d. 
20 /d. at 598. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. 
23 Id. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
24 570 F. Supp. at 598. 
25 /d. Massachusetts had traditionally espoused the lex loci contractus principle. See 
Cameron v. Gunstock Acres, Inc., 370 Mass. 378, 381-82, 348 N.E.2d 791, 793 (1976); 
Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878). 
26 570 F. Supp. at 598-99. 
27 378 Mass. 535, 392 N.E.2d 1045 (1979). 
28 570 F. Supp. at 599. 
29 /d. 
30 /d. In this connection, the district court observed that the facts gave rise to a difficult 
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necessary, however, to examine the approaches referred to by the Su-
preme Judicial Court in Choate, Hall as alternatives to the old lex loci 
contractus rule. 31 Although unable to select among the current theories 
because of the fact pattern in Choate, Hall, the Supreme Judicial Court 
had cited with approbation Currie's "interest" analysis and the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws' "most significant relationship" test. 32 
The district court determined that the Restatement (Second) approach 
was not an effective means for resolving the conflicts problem in Bushkin 
because of the difficulty in definitively identifying the locations of con-
tacts necessary to single out the state with the most significant relation-
ship to the transaction. 33 The court instead opted for "interest" analysis 
as the way to settle the conflict between New York and Massachusetts 
law. 34 Interest analysis, the court stated, looks to the policies underlying 
each state's substantive law and then analyzes the facts of the case in 
view of these policies to determine which state has the superior interest in 
having its law applied. 35 
The district court first examined the purposes underlying the relevant 
part of the New York statute offrauds as seen in its legislative history and 
in New York court decisions. 36 The court stated that the New York 
statute of frauds provision sought to protect the principals in the sale of a 
going business from unfounded claims of finder and to encourage cer-
tainty through the use of written fee contracts. 37 According to the court, 
this policy included principals from outside of New York who used New 
York brokers and finders in order to benefit from New York's position as 
a national and international center for the purchase and sale of busines-
ses.38 The court found that "Bushkin, as a New York City investment 
adviser, [fell] into the heart of New York's interest in maintaining, and 
encouraging New York's position as a business center." 39 
Turning to Massachusetts law, the court found that Massachusetts had 
only a minimal interest in applying the underlying policies of the law 
which did not invalidate oral fee agreements to the instant case. 40 The 
court determined that the "soundness of Massachusetts policy or the 
issue of contract law. Since the oral agreement was negotiated over the telephone, in which 
jurisdiction, New York or Massachusetts, did acceptance take place? Id. 
31 570 F. Supp. at 599-600. 
32 See 378 Mass. at 541, 392 N.E.2d at 1048-49. 
33 570 F. Supp. at 600. 
34 ld. at 600-01. 
35 /d. 
36 ld. 
37 ld. at 601. 
38 ld. at 601-02. 
39 Id. at 602. Bushkin's place of business was in New York and he encouraged Raytheon's 
interest in Beech from New York. ld. 
40 ld. 
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stability of its financial community" was not an issue in Bushkin. Accord-
ing to the court, Massachusetts has no interest in denying the protection 
of New York's policy of protecting foreign principals from un-
memorialized contracts, even at the expense of New York brokers and 
finders, to a Massachusetts company. 41 The district court concluded that 
"interest analysis clearly tips the scale in favor of applying New York law 
to the facts of this case. " 42 
Applying New York law, the Bushkin court found that the New York 
statute of frauds clearly invalidated the oral contract between Bushkin 
and Raytheon. 43 The court also held that the statute of frauds barred 
Bushkin's implied contract claim for the reasonable value of the informa-
tion and services rendered to Raytheon. 44 Finally, the court rejected 
Bushkin's allegation that Raytheon engaged in unfair and deceptive acts 
and practices, noting that this claim merely restated Bushkin's express 
and implied contract counts.45 The district court therefore allowed Ray-
theon's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Bushkin's com-
plaint. 46 
In summary, the vested rights lex loci contractus doctrine is no longer 
viable conflicts law for contract cases in Massachusetts, despite the 
inopportuneness of the Choate, Hall decision for a definitive rejection of 
that rule. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court clearly wishes to 
endorse the contacts or functional approach to contract conflicts issues 
already adopted by a large number of states. Hence, the United States 
District Court inBushkin accurately reflected Massachusetts conflicts law 
when the court stated that it "respectfully anticipates that the [Supreme 
Judicial Court] will discard the strict requirements of the place-of-making 
rule when next confronted with the issue. " 47 It is not as certain, however, 
that the selection of interest analysis over "the most significant relation-
ship" approach in the Restatement (Second) in Bushkin mirrors the cur-
rent conflicts thinking of the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The United States District Court's decision in Bushkin illustrates the 
use of interest analysis in resolving choice-of-law issues and correctly 
applied New York law. Aficionados of the Restatement (Second) would 
contend, however, that sections 6 and 188 of the Restatement (Second) 
would reach the same result. 48 Supporters of the Restatement (Second) 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 ld. at 603. 
45 Id. 
46 ld. 
47 570 F. Supp. at 599. 
48 See W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 484-86, 586-89 (8th ed. 1984). 
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would also repudiate the suggestion in Bushkin that this approach "could 
degenerate into little more than mechanical contact counting. " 49 The 
Restatement (Second) determines the state of most significant relationship 
by qualitative analysis, and not merely by quantitative considerations. 50 
Moreover, the Supreme Judicial Court espoused the Restatement (Sec-
ond) approach in a recent conflict contract case. 51 Although the district 
court's decision in Bushkin is certainly defensible, it may not be an 
accurate prediction of the approach the Supreme Judicial Court would 
take in a similar case. 
49 570 F. Supp. at 600. 
50 See REESE & ROSENBERG, supra note 48. 
5t Morris v. Watsco, Inc., 385 Mass. 672,433 N.E.2d 886 (1982). See Nicholson, Conflict 
of Laws, 1982 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 7.8 at 274-77. 
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